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AMERICA'S SHIFTING FASCINATION WITH
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
EDWARD B. ROCK*
In the last few years, comparative corporate governance-German and
Japanese corporate governance in particular-has been a hot topic in U.S.
law reviews and conferences.' Some of the best contemporary corporate
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. This is a revised version of a
lecture I gave to German bankers, corporate lawyers and academics at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe -
Universitit, Frankfurt am Main, Germany in June 1994.
I am grateful to participants in workshops at the Faculty of Law, Johann Wolfgang Goethe -
Universitit, Frankfurt am Main, and the Faculty of Law, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, for helpful
comments and criticisms. Special thanks to Mark Roe and Richard Buxbaum for helping me
(incompletely, I fear) to avoid miseharacterizing their views. All remaining errors are, of course, my
own. The interested reader should read the marvelous articles by Professors Roe and Buxbaum and
others and form their own judgments. This work was supported by the University of Pennsylvania's
Institute for Law and Economics and the Institut fir Arbeits-, Wirtschafts- und Zivil Recht, Faculty of
Law, Johann Wolfgang Goethe - Universitit, Frankfurt am Main.
1. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Brittania?: Institutional Investor
Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92MiCH. L. REv. 1997 (1994); RichardM. Buxbaum, Institutional
Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative Perspective, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1991); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 1277 (1991) (discussing Germany, Japan, Sweden, Canada and the UK); Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies as Guardian Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the
Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L. REv. 985 (1993) (examining whether a Swedish form of
investment company could be useful in American corporate governance); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV.
863, 876 (1991) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director]; Ronald J. Gilson
& Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and
Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871 (1993); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New
System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 187,
218-22 (1991) (drawing parallels to the German and Japanese systems); J. Mark Ramseyer, Takeovers
in Japan: Opportunism, Ideology and Corporate Control, 35 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1987); Mark J. Roe,
A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 59-62 (1991) (Germany)
[hereinafter Roe, A Political Theory]; Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in
Germany, Japan and the United States, 102 YALE LJ. 1927 (1993) [hereinafter Roe, Some Differences];
Symposium: The American Corporation and The Institutional Investor: Are There Lessons from
Abroad?, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 739.
These articles should be distinguished from the interesting and informative comparative work
produced by foreign comparativists, which raise different issues. See, e.g., Werner F. Ebke, In Search
of Alternatives: Comparative Reflections on Corporate Governance and the Independent Auditor's
Responsibilities, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 663 (1984); Klaus J. Hopt, New Ways in Corporate Governance:
European Experiments with Labor Representation on Corporate Boards, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1338 (1984);
Friedrich K. Kfibler, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A German Dilemma, 57 BROOK.
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law scholars have focused on German bank centered corporate governance
structures, as well as the Japanese bank centered keiretsu structure,2 for
alternatives to traditional U.S. forms. What is one to make of this
development? The intuition that one can fruitfully transplant legal rules or
institutions from one system to another is as old as the law itself.3 The
temptation is to try to get something for nothing, or at least at a discount.
In this Article, I want to focus on the specific emergence of the
comparativist turn in American corporate law scholarship, to try to appraise
the significance of the recent American fascination with German and
Japanese corporate governance, and to consider what it tells us about the
possible path dependance of corporate law scholarship. Before turning to
the comparative scholarship, however, I will first try to put it into context
by giving a quick and somewhat idiosyncratic overview of the modem
history of corporate law scholarship in the United States.
I. THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN AGE: BERLE AND MEANS
Writing in the depths of the Great Depression, Adolf Berle and Gardiner
Means set the course of modem American corporate law scholarship.4
When one reads their great work, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property,5 the contemporary scholar finds its style and much of its content
as familiar, as. comfortable, as any recently published article. While many
of its analyses and prescriptions are dated, it continues to define the field.
In their book, Berie, a law professor, and Means, an economist, set out
to map the separation of ownership and control that they took to define the
modem publicly held corporation. In Book 1,6 Berle and Means document-
ed in detail the concentration of economic power in the largest corpora-
tions, the vast dispersion of ownership7 and the mechanisms that managers
used to maintain control over a corporation that they did not own. In Book
L. REV. 97(1991); Christian J. Meier-Schatz, Corporate Governance andLegal Rules: A Transnational
Look at Concepts and Problems of Internal Management Control, 13 J. CORP. L. 431 (1988).
2. The term Keiretsu describes the Japanese system of cross-shareholding between related
corporations. See generally Gilson & Roe, supra note 1.
3. For a marvelous historical account, see ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1974).
4. ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1991).
5. Id. My sense is that this is a book more cited rather than read. If true, it is unfortunate both
because of the book's influence on modem scholarship as well as its still substantial merits as corporate
law scholarship that bridges economics and legal doctrine.
6. Id. at 3-112.
7. In 1929, the largest shareholders of the largest corporations typically owned less than 1%; even




II,' they described the declining legal restrictions on management,
including the weakening of shareholder control over the direction of the
enterprise,9 the elimination of state supervision over contributions of
capital,'0 the diminution of preemptive rights," and the modifications of
restrictions on dividends." These two sections, which comprise the bulk
of the book, led Berle and Means to claim that "under such conditions
control may be held by the directors or titular managers who can employ
the proxy machinery to become a self-perpetuating body, even though as
a group they own but a small fraction of the stock outstanding."' 3
Berle and Means left an indelible stamp on American corporate law
scholarship in two principal dimensions. First, and probably most
significantly, they implicitly and explicitly defined the central problem for
corporate law to be the separation of ownership and control, and defined
the task of corporate law scholarship to be the correction or, at least,
mitigation of the negative effects of the separation. Berle and Means argued
that the law must protect the shareholders who, because of the separation
of ownership and control, will inevitably be passive. Thus, Berle and
Means gave American corporate law scholarship a practical, reformist style
that persists to this day. As we will see, much of the ensuing sixty years
of scholarship has been a search for the appropriate champion of
shareholders' interests.
Second, Berle and Means' analysis began with economics and turned to
legal and doctrinal issues only after a long empirical analysis. In so doing
they implicitly claimed that economics drives corporate law, with respect
to the issues that corporate law must address (the reformist point), as well
as with respect to the evolution of legal doctrine. The theme of Book II is
that the concentration of economic power and the separation of ownership
from control led, through some unspecified mechanism, to the relaxation
of legal controls over managers. 4 Here, too, Berle and Means' influence
on corporate law scholarship has been so fundamental and deep-seated that
American corporate law academics can hardly conceive of alternative
approaches. Like Berle and Means, almost all corporate law scholars
8. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 119-244.
9. Id. at 128-31.
10. Id. at 131-33.
11. Id. at 133-35.
12. Id. at 135-36.
13. Id. at 6.
14. Id. at 119-244.
1996] 369
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
respond to the market and focus on the interaction between law and
economics.
II. THE 1960S AND 1970S: THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AS
SHAREHOLDERS' CHAMPION
The normative model of the corporation reflected in most corporate
statutes, as well as in Berle and Means' work, is that "the business and
affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors."" On this model, the shareholders own the corporation
and delegate the operation of the corporation to the directors, who then set
policy and hire managers to execute that policy.
Berle and Means vigorously argued that the reality of the management-
dominated corporation was inconsistent with this normative model. In the
management-dominated corporation, managers run the show, choosing
directors and operating free of any shareholder scrutiny.
This gap between the normative model and reality animated much of the
corporate law scholarship of the period. Some proposed reforms that would
bring corporate reality into line with the normative model. 6 Three
institutional failings were thought to stand in the way of directors playing
the role anticipated by the statute: constraints of time; constraints of
information; and constraints of composition.' 7 To redress directors' time
constraints, a number of scholars proposed the creation of "professional
directors," directors who, by virtue of being full-time, would have the time
to behave as the normative model suggested.'8 Similarly, other scholars
proposed that directors have their own separate staff, in order to give them
the information and independent expertise necessary to direct the enter-
prise.19
These proposals-none of which was adopted-faced all of the
predictable criticisms. Once a director becomes a full-time director,
especially if appointed by the CEO, how does he or she differ from any of
the other members of the management group? Would creating a "shadow
staff," with responsibility for second guessing management but limited
15. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991).
16. For a collection of articles that illustrate the populist concerns of scholars of the 1950s, see
THE CORPORA7ION IN MODERN SOCIETY (Edward S. Mason ed., 1959).
17. For a discussion of these constraints, see MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE
CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 141-48 (1976).
18. See id. at 150-52.




responsibility for the results, cause more harm than good? Would it be
duplicative and interfere with the running of the company?
During this same period, the Securities Exchange Commission began to
study mutual funds, and their distinctive problems. In a series of reports,20
close attention was paid to governance problems of investment companies,
culminating in the 1970 amendments to the Investment Company Act.2
These amendments introduced a number of governance devices to mitigate
the conflict of interest between the fund managers and the shareholders of
the funds. Specifically, the Investment Company Act was amended to
require that at least forty percent of the directors (or trustees) of an
investment company be disinterested.' In addition, the Act requires that
the advisory contracts between Fund X and Adviser Y be in writing, be
approved by a vote of a majority of outstanding shares, and be approved
by a majority of the disinterested directors of Fund X.' Both amendments
were designed to strengthen the board of directors as a counterweight to,
and monitor of, fund managers.
At around the same time, Melvin Eisenberg, in a series of articles written
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, shifted the debate in an important
direction.24 He argued that the board of the modem, publicly held
corporation cannot direct the operation of the enterprise, and none of the
reform proposals of the 1960s was likely to permit it to do so. In the
modem public corporation, the managers set policy, and no tinkering with
20. See, eg., SECURITIES EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF
INVESTMENT COMPANY GROwTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337,89th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1966); SECUITIES EXCH.
COMM'N, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971);
WHARTON SCH. OF FIN. AND COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS, H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
21. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, PUB. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (codified
in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 80a). Mutual funds have a distinctive organizational form that
differs from most other corporations. Mutual funds, or, in the terms used in the relevant statutes,
"investment companies," are companies that invest in securities. Investment Company Act § 3(a), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1994). Typically, Fund X will be a corporation organized by Investment Adviser
Firm Y which will manage Fund X for a fee that is usually a percentage of assets under management.
Having organized Fund X, Adviser Y enters into a management contract with X, which then sells shares
of X to the public-sometimes directly, sometimes through brokers. Mutual fund investors are thus
shareholders of Fund X, who depend on the performance of Adviser Y for their returns.
22. Investment Company Act § 10(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a). If an investment company has a
regular broker or a principal underwriter on its board, a majority of the directors must be independent
of the broker or underwriter. Investment Company Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(b).
23. Investment Company Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15.
24. These articles were integrated to form Eisenberg's, The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal
Analysis. EISENBERG, supra note 17.
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the directors can change this.
So, argued Eisenberg, one needs to change the normative model to give
the board a job that it can do. The job that Eisenberg carved out for the
board is the now familiar notion that the board should monitor manage-
ment.2 He then set out to describe the changes in the structure of
corporate governance necessary to permit the board to monitor manage-
ment, generalizing from the mutual fund analysis. 26
For directors to monitor managers on behalf of the (passive) sharehold-
ers, directors must have sufficient time, information and independence to
do so. Otherwise, the new model would be undermined as the old
normative model had been. Eisenberg thus argued for the establishment of
committees of the board comprised of directors independent of manage-
ment. Specifically, he proposed that an audit committee should be
established, staffed by independent directors charged with the responsibility
of hiring and firing the outside auditor, determining the appropriate
accounting principles to be used in presenting the corporation's financial
reports, and receiving reports from the auditors of any managerial
malfeasance.27 In order to prevent the CEO from packing the board with
cronies, or undermining the independence of the board in more subtle ways,
Eisenberg proposed that the committee responsible for nominating new
directors and current directors for re-election should be comprised of
independent directors. Similarly, because compensation of senior manage-
ment is both critical to providing optimal incentives, and is the area in
which conflicts of interest loom largest, the compensation committee should
be comprised of independent directors. Finally, because the monitoring of
senior management performance and the hiring and firing of senior
management are the single most critical functions of the board, the board
itself should either be exclusively comprised of independent directors or at
least dominated by them.
During this reconceptualization of the board, a number of American
corporate law academics, most prominently Alfred Conard and Detlev
Vagts, focused American attention on the German two-tier board structure
as an institutional alternative and as a suggestive model for reform in the
United States.28 Two of the proposals to address separation of ownership
25. EISENBERG, supra note 17, at 162-68.
26. Id. at 56-63.
27. Id. at 205-09.
28. Alfred F. Conard, Company Laws of the European Communities from an American Viewpoint,




and control discussed in the mid-1960s were the appointment of a fiduciary
to represent the shareholders29 and the intervention of various financial
intermediaries, particularly pension funds and investment trusts, that would
gradually begin to exercise the powers to which their holdings entitle
them.3" Professor Vagts noted that
[e]ach of the two approaches just suggested has its rough counterpart in
German law. The German supervisory council represents a deliberate attempt
to furnish the shareholders with a "watchdog" group to represent their
interests, and the bankers' depositary vote is an intermediary that has evolved
so as to concentrate voting power.3'
Professor Conard was similarly taken with the German approach:
The advantages of [the German] system may be more impressive to an
American than to others because it is in the United States that the theory of
management control was first articulated by Adolph Berle and Gardiner
Means, and has been repeated in later studies .... Its most obvious advantage
is that it provides a separate group of independent observers to decide how
well the managers are doing. Because they meet separately from the
managers whom they supervise, they are likely to be much more independent
than the traditional "outside directors" of American boards, who usually meet
only in the presence, and even under the chairmanship, of the inside
managers. Moreover, this structure frees them from responsibility for the
ordinary management decisions which are the proper business of the full-time
executives. 2
In addition to the two-tier board structure, Conard also focused on other
distinctive legal features of the German approach, including co-determina-
tion, the existence of a separate legal regime for closely held companies,
and the system of share certificates in bearer form and their transfer.33
[hereinafter Conrad, CompanyLaws]; Detlev Vagts, Reforming the "Modern " Corporation: Perspectives
from the German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23 (1966). See also Thomas J. Schoenbaum & Joachim Lieser,
Reform of the Structure of the American Corporation: The "Two Tier" Board Model, 62 Ky. L.J. 91
(1973). See generally EISENBERG, supra note 17, at 177-85. For later work from the same perspective,
see Alfred F. Conard, The Supervision of Corporate Management: A Comparison of Developments in
European Community and United States Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1459 (1984).
29. See Vagts, supra note 28, at 49 & n.107.
30. See id. at 49 & n.108.
31. Id. at 49-50.
32. Conard, Company Laws, supra note 28, at 52.
33. Id. at 54-55, 59-62. It is important to note that both Vagts and Conard were acutely aware of
the dangers and difficulties of comparative approaches. Id. at 53 ("Even assuming that they work quite
well in West Germany, one may well ask whether they will be equally effective elsewhere."). See, e.g.,
Vagts, supra note 28, at 25 ("To approach German corporation law with the objective of gaining
1996]
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HI. THE 1980s: THE TAKEOVER ERA
Beginning in the 1980s, with the widespread and dramatic emergence of
hostile takeovers in the United States, the focus of corporate law scholar-
ship shifted dramatically away from the Eisenberg approach of focusing on
legal and institutional mechanisms for controlling management discretion.
In its place, scholars looked to the market, and, in particular, to the so
called "market for corporate control" to protect shareholders from
managerial abuse.34
Corporate control contests, which combined all of the attractions of high
stakes poker and war, became the dominant focus of corporate law
scholarship during the 1980s. While academics disagreed on the details,
they shared a common and fundamental belief that the market for corporate
control was the single most important constraint on corporate management
and that the law should strive to maximize its effectiveness.35 This
market-based approach continued to dominate academic corporate law
perspective on the American situation means that one must face head-on the two most difficult issues
about any foreign legal institution: (a) How does it work over there? (b) How would it work over
here?").
34. The story really begins with an extraordinarily prescient article from 1966 by Henry Manne
called Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965). In this article,
Manne argued that a significant cost of an antitrust policy that restricts horizontal mergers is that
managers will be insulated from the market discipline imposed by the threat of takeovers. The keystone
of Marine's argument was that competitors are the parties most likely to be able to recognize bad
management, to be able to reverse it, and to have access to sufficient financing to acquire poorly
managed firms. Id. a 112-13, 118-19. If this is correct-and it certainly seems to be-then the merger
policy pursued by the Department of Justice in the 1960s, which almost entirely prohibited horizontal
mergers, increased managerial dominance at the expense of shareholders.
Beginning in 1980, with the election of Ronald Reagan and, more importantly for these purposes,
the appointment of William Baxter as head of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, U.S.
policy on horizontal mergers changed nearly 180 degrees. Suddenly, horizontal mergers, even between
large firms with relatively large market shares, were permissible. This brought a large number of eager
and high valuing buyers into the market for corporate control and set off a decade long merger boom.
In the prototypical 1980s' "bust up" takeover, an acquirer would pay a large premium over prevailing
market price for a company. Then the acquirer would sell off pieces to buyers from the same industry,
buyers who had previously been excluded from the market.
35. For representative and prominent examples, see the academic debate over whether target
management should be passive in the face of a hostile tender offer or whether they should have the
limited power to seek competing bids. Compare Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fisehel, The Proper
Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161 (1981) and
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV.
1 (1982) with Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HAR'. L.
REV. 1028 (1982) and Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender




throughout the 1980s and represented a fundamentally different approach
than either the Eisenberg institutional reform program or the managerialism
of corporate management and the lawyers who typically represented them.
IV. THE 1990s: THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM
Then the music stopped. In the late 1980s, in the wake of the 1987
market crash, the downfall of Drexel Burnham Lambert, the determination
by the U.S. Supreme Court that the anti-takeover statutes passed by many
states were constitutional,36 and the decision of the Delaware Supreme
Court in the Time Warner case,37 which was widely interpreted as
permitting target managers to "just say no", the age of hostile tender offers
died. Suddenly, the shareholders' champion of the 1980s-the market for
corporate control-seemed to wither away. Wall Street firms laid off or
reassigned takeover lawyers. Takeover artists shifted their attention (at least
temporarily) to managing the assets they had acquired. Michael Milken
went to jail. And corporate law academics looked for something else to
write about.
Like Rip Van Winkle waking from a fifty-year sleep, corporate law
academics returned to the Berle and Means paradigm, but the world seemed
to have changed. In place of the widely dispersed shareholdings chronicled
by Berle and Means, we found that shareholding had become much more
concentrated. Now, we had a group of very large and increasingly active
institutional investors.3" Moreover, institutional holdings were (and
continue to be) concentrated in relatively few institutions, at least in
comparison to the Berle and Means corporation.39
Moreover, these institutional investors seemed to have finally found their
voice. Some began high profile campaigns against management-imposed
36. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
37. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). It turned out that
the Time-Warner decision did not protect target managers to the extent anticipated. See Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
38. See generally Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEo. L.J. 445 (1991). Between 1950 and 1989, pension funds went from
owning less than 1% of equities to holding in excess of 26%. Id. at 447. Institutional investors as a
group (pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, bank-managed funds and charitable and
educational endowments) went from holding 8% of equities to more than 45%. Id. Of the top 50 U.S.
corporations ranked by 1989 stock market value, 45 had institutional ownership in excess of 33% and
25 in excess of 50%, and many with even more. Id.
39. The twenty largest pension funds account for about 26% of the total pension fund assets. Id.
at 44748.
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takeover defenses and scored significant victories.40 Institutional investors
also forced out poorly performing managers.4t
Also during the early 1990s, Mark Roe began to revisit the political
history of American corporate law.42 In an important series of articles,
Roe argued that the fragmentation of American shareholding and the
traditional passivity of American shareholders was not the inevitable result
of economic growth, as argued by Berle and Means, but was largely the
result of a series of political choices. Roe suggested that American
populism combined with interest group politics and the structure of
American federalism may have led to the fragmentation of the American
banking system (with many states confining banks to a single branch), as
compared to the national banking systems that characterize Germany and
Japan.43 Likewise, these same forces, Roe argued, may have led to
prohibitions on shareholding by insurance companies for most of the
twentieth century, ' as well as regulatory limitations on mutual funds.4 s
Scholars began to write on two different aspects of the same problem.
One group of articles focused on the rise of institutional investors. Within
this group, there was sharp disagreement over the significance of this
change and the extent to which institutional investors were likely to emerge
as shareholders' champions. In the optimists' camp, scholars argued that,
if only we removed the regulatory barriers to institutional investor activism,
the newly energized shareholders would assume their rightful place as
shareholders' champions, acting as effective monitors of management.46
In making this argument, the optimists, of course, were following in the
footsteps of Berle and Means in taking the task of corporate law to be the
40. Rock, supra note 38, at 478-90.
41. Id.
42. Roe, A Political Theory, supra note 1; Mark J. Roe, Foundations of Corporate Finance: The
1906 Pacification of the Insurance Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 639 (1993) [hereinafter Roe,
Foundations of Corporate Finance); Mark J. Roe, Political and Legal Restraints on Ownership and
Control of Public Companies, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 7 (1990); Mark J. Roe, Political Elements In the
Creation of a Mutual Fund Industry, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1469 (1991) [hereinafter Roe, Political
Elements]. These articles provided the basis for Roe's book, MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK
OWNERS: THE POLITICAL RooTs OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
43. See Roe, Some Differences, supra note 1.
44. See Roe, Foundations of Corporate Finance, supra note 42.
45. See Roe, Political Elements, supra note 42.
46. Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39
UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv.
520 (1990); Gilson & Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director, supra note 1, at 871; Joseph




reformist task of adjusting the law to solve the problem of the separation
of ownership and control.
On the other side of the debate, scholars argued that institutional
investors are unlikely to fulfill their promise.4" The critique has followed
a number of paths. First, there is little evidence that corporate governance
activism increases shareholder returns. Second, to the extent that the rise
of institutional investors helps to solve the collective action problem
identified by Berle and Means, it does so by means of agents who bring
with them all of the agency problems so familiar from the corporate
context. The managers of institutional investors, the money managers, face
conflicts of interest between their duty to maximize the value of their
portfolio, and pressure from corporate management, exerted in a variety of
ways. While managers of public employee pension funds-the most
prominent institutional investor activists-are relatively immune from
pressure from corporate management, they are particularly susceptible to
political pressure.48 Moreover, the incentives facing institutional money
managers depart sharply from those of their beneficiaries: The agents,
unlike the beneficiaries, benefit from corporate governance activism only
if it provides a selective benefit, not if it leads to a systemic improvement.
Systemic improvements, while increasing the value of the managed
portfolio, also increase the value of the portfolio of competing money
managers as well. The lack of incentives is aggravated by the fact that
managers of widely diversified funds compete to be the low-cost provider,
leaving little to invest in monitoring corporate managers.
Finally, the market and institutional checks on money managers are, in
fact, weaker than those on corporate managers. Takeovers are impossible.
Capital market checks are non-existent because institutional investors are
suppliers rather than purchasers of capital. The market for money managers
supplies an uncertain constraint as it is unclear that active monitoring is
valued in that market. Finally, product market checks, while in some cases
significant, vary from institutional investor to institutional investor, with
many beneficiaries locked in. Legal checks are not much better insofar as
courts have been even less active in enforcing the duty of loyalty and duty
of care than in the corporate context.
47. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 1; Edward B. Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of Relational
Investing, 15 CAtiozo L. REv. 987 (1994); Rock, supra note 38, at 505; Roberta Romano, Public
Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993).
48. Rock, supra note 38, at 471-72; Romano, supra note 47.
1996]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
V. PROFESSOR ROE'S NEW COMPARATIVISM
The domestic debate over institutional investors led some scholars to
look abroad, to discover the role played by institutional investors in other
systems and to analyze the differences in regulatory treatment. Whereas, in
the 1960s and 1970s, American legal scholars, like Professors Vagts and
Conard, looked to German corporate law for alternative legal/institutional
arrangements-principally, the two-tier board and, to a lesser extent, co-
determination-attention was now directed to a very different sort of
comparative analysis, namely, the analysis of alternative economic
governance structures. In particular, U.S. scholars have focused on the
relatively prominent role that large banks play in Germany and Japan, as
compared to the United States.49
In this context, comparative analyses are important for two reasons. First,
if governance structures are fundamentally different in other highly
industrialized and highly successful market economies, such as Germany
and Japan, then perhaps they could have been different in the United States.
This goes to the question of whether the Berle and Means corporation is an
economic inevitability, as they suggested, or is, in large measure, the
product of a series of political choices, as Roe argues. Second, and more
reformist, if the structures could have been different, perhaps they should
be different. Perhaps America would be better off freeing its shareholders,
especially its large banks, so that they can play a role similar to that played
by large German and Japanese banks.
On the first claim, the comparative evidence is important and persuasive.
As Roe has argued, the fact that governance is organized differently, and
apparently successfully in other large industrialized economies undermines
any claim of inevitability to the Berle and Means corporation." To the
extent that differences in corporate governance correlate with differences
in financial regulation, it lends support to Roe's hypothesis that the politics
of financial intermediation is a key determinant to corporate structure. In
the same context, Roe argues against the claim that Germany and Japan
simply lag behind America's financial evolution, and thus against the
argument that, in time, finance liquifies and disintermediates. While
acknowledging that the boardroom power of the large German and Japanese
49. See, e.g. Roe, Some Differences, supra note I.
50. See id. For perceptive critiques of Roe's article, see J. Mark Ramseyer, Columbia Cartel
Launches Bid for Japanese Firms, 102 YALE L.J. 2005 (1993); Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note




banks is under stress from the increased securitization of debt (which
displaces bank lending) and the internationalization of financial markets,
banks' stock ownership and control through the proxy system has remained
constant or increased. 51
It is the second, reformist claim that is the most interesting and
controversial. In this regard, one should focus again on Mark Roe's work.
The promise of the German and Japanese systems, to some American eyes,
is that they offer the benefits of close and active supervision, without the
costs of the hostile tender offers of the 1980s. Thus, Professor Roe wrote
in 1991:
Certainly concentrated control by financial institutions is imaginable: Japanese
and German corporate ownership is quite concentrated; their financial
institutions are more actively involved in their companies than are financial
institutions in the United States. Daimler-Benz, the automotive concem that
is the largest German industrial company, has a 28% shareholder, Deutsche
Bank. When managerial infighting recently left the company without clear
direction, the bank replaced Daimler-Benz' senior management without the
organizational violence of a hostile takeover.52
Professor Roe does not make the more dramatic claim that the United
States would be better off freeing its banks so that they could play the kind
of role played by banks in Germany or Japan. The world, Roe recognizes,
is a very complicated place, and the present options depend in significant
measure on history (i.e, development is "path-dependent.").53 But the more
dramatic suggestion lurks in the background, sometimes more prominently,
sometimes less, and even if Roe does not make the claim, others will. It is
this suggestion that I want to consider. What should one make of these
comparisons?
There are a number of points that one can make. First, the view of
German corporate governance in which the three big banks play an
51. Roe, Some Differences, supra note 1, at 1958-62.
52. Roe, A Political Theory, supra note 1, at 15. For a longer, more detailed, and more cautious
assessment, see Roe, Some Differences, supra note 1, at 1977-95. For suggestions that insurers could
play a more important role in the U.S., as they do in Germany, except for regulatory restrictions, see
Roe, Foundations of Corporate Finance, supra note 42, at 641-42.
Roe, however, is clearly aware that this alternative monitoring structure may carry significant costs
of its own. See, e.g., Roe, A Political Theory, supra note I, at 61 ("To be sure, [banks] may not take
the stock to monitor, but to force controlled companies to take loans or do deals!"). Roe also advocates
the use of "comparative studies to learn when the close ties between banks and industry in Japan and
Germany are beneficial and when they are detrimental." Id. at 62.
53. Roe, Some Differences, supra note 1, at 1992-93.
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important and constructive role as management monitors may be somewhat
unrecognizable to the German corporate law community. When I presented
this paper in Frankfurt, the lawyers and bankers in the audience found it
extraordinary that anyone should think that the system in fact worked this
way. In their view, the large banks played a far less significant and far less
constructive role.54 Along these same lines, the effectiveness of the large
German banks as monitors of management perhaps looked better a few
years ago than today, after the disaster at Metalgesellschaft.55
Second, and more provocative, what is one to make of the fact that
General Motors' German subsidiary, Opel, is generally considered to be as
well-managed as other German car companies? This is a problem for any
claim that the United States should free its banks, because G.M. is an oft-
cited example of what is so wrong with American corporate governance.
How is it that Opel, with such a parent (and no hausbank), has been
successful? One response is that Opel fits the model because it has a large
shareholder, G.M. But that response fails because so do Chevrolet,
Oldsmobile and the other poorly performing divisions of G.M. A second
response is that the German car market is an oligopoly, and it is easy for
managers to look good when there are oligopoly profits. However, this
argument, even if true, would prove too much: Daimler-Benz is likewise a
car company.56 This, of course, leaves standing Roe's deeper and more
fundamental argument against the inevitability of the Berle Means
corporation: The fact that Daimler-Benz and General Motors are organized
differently at the top proves that alternative governance structures are
economically possible.
Third, of course, German fields looked much greener when the United
States was stuck in a recession and Germany seemed to be prospering than
if things had been the other way around. The tone of comparative corporate
scholarship has changed over the last few years as the U.S. economy has
54. But German audiences may have a different baseline: While banks may seem to play a small
role in German boardrooms, their role may still be substantially greater than their role in U.S.
boardrooms.
55. In December 1994, Metallgersellschaft, one of Germany's largest industrial conglomerates,
nearly collapsed after taking huge losses on derivatives. See Metallgesellschafi: Germany's Corporate
Whodunnit, ECONOMIST, Feb. 4, 1995, at 71. Some experts blame Deutsche Bank's premature
intervention for the fiasco. Id.
56. Neither Roe's example ofDeutsche Bank's relationship with Daimler-Benz in Roe, A Political
Theory, supra note 1, at 15, nor my counterexample of Opel, is, of course, anything more than





bounced back and Germany and Japan have lagged, and may change with
the business cycle yet again as Germany and Japan pull out of recession.
Fourth, we do not know whether the bank centered structure that has
historically characterized Germany and Japan is primarily driven by
corporate governance concerns.5 7 As Mark Roe and Ronald Gilson have
argued,58 the Japanese keiretsu structure may be as much about establish-
ing an efficient form of industrial organization to support a distinctive
relationship between firms and their suppliers/customers, as it is about
constraining agency costs.59 Similarly, an alternative hypothesis about
German corporate governance is that the bank's role largely revolves
around preserving and expanding its lending activities, with only secondary
(or tertiary) attention to corporate governance.
Fifth, what evidence supports the implicit premise that German and
Japanese firms are more productive than U.S. firms? The best evidence
seems to indicate that this assertion-sometimes taken to be self-evidently
true in the U.S.-is false or, at least, unsupported.60
Professor Roe explicitly makes a more modest (but still important and
controversial) reformist point that avoids many of these criticisms. Roe
argues that if comparative work shows that different governance structures
are possible between countries, then we should reform domestic law to
permit governance structures to compete within the U.S. system.6, If
different governance structures are possible, and if different structures have
different advantages and disadvantages in different contexts, then why not
let them compete within the U.S. system, and not just in the competition
between the United States and Germany or the United States and Japan? On
this point, I am in complete agreement with Roe: Where possible,
competition among governance structures within the U.S. system should be
facilitated. Here, Roe's comparative analysis demonstrating the historical
and political contingency of the U.S. structure of corporate governance has
significant payoffs in the domestic debate. There is, however, a further
question, which I will address in more detail below, over the extent to
which competing governance systems are possible within a given corporate
57. Romano, supra note 50, at 2033.
58. See Gilson & Roe, supra note 1.
59. Id.
60. For a review of the evidence, see Romano, supra note 50, at 2023-26.
61. See Roe, Some Differences, supra note 1, at 1989-97. A comparison of Roe, A Political
Theory, supra note 1, with Roe, Some Differences, supra note 1, suggests that Professor Roe may have
tempered his reformist impulses in the intervening years.
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To the extent that regulations that have outlived their usefulness stand in
the way of the exercise of institutional voice, Roe argues, we should at
least consider removing such blockages. In this approach, the critical
analytical questions become whether particular regulations have, in fact,
outlived their usefulness, the extent to which they stand in the way of an
expanded role for institutional investors, and the transition costs.
Examples of such regulations are the SEC proxy rules restricting
communication among shareholders. 63 Because of the expansive defini-
tions of "Proxy" and "solicitation," informal communication among large
shareholders on matters of common concern posed a significant legal
risk.' Cautious shareholders would not proceed without first preclearing
all "proxy solicitation" materials with the SEC, an expensive and time
consuming process.65 In reforming the proxy rules to ease the restrictions
on communications among shareholders, the SEC eliminated (a few)
barriers to the evolution of alternative governance structures without either
mandating the adoption of such structures or exposing shareholders to
significant dangers.66
VI. PROFESSOR BuxBAuM'S COMPARATIVE LEGITIMATION THESIS
I now want to turn to a different contemporary approach to comparative
corporate law. If the older comparative approach of Professor Vagts and
Conard67 looked to Germany for potential legal transplants, and if the
newer comparative analyses of Professor Roe and others looked to
Germany and Japan for alternative economic governance structures,
Professor Richard Buxbaum has taken yet a third approach. Among
American law professors, no one rivals Professor Buxbaum in "his intimate
62. See infra Part VIII.
63. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to 240.14b-2 (1995).
64. Rule 14a-l(f) defines a proxy as every "proxy, consent or authorization within the meaning
of section 14(a) of the Act." 17 C.F.R. § 14a-l(f) (1995). Solicitation includes "any request for a proxy,
... [a]ny request to execute or not to execute, or to revoke, a proxy; ... or ... [t]he furnishing of a
form of proxy or other communication to security holders under circumstances reasonably calculated
to result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of proxy." 17 C.F.R. § 14a-1(l).
65. See generally Bernard S. Black, Disclosure, Not Censorship: The Case for Proxy Reform, 17
J. CoRP. L. 49 (1991).
66. See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 31,326,
[1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,051 (Oct. 16, 1992) (describing the changes to
rules 14a-1, 14a-2 and 14a-6, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1, 240.14a-2 & 240.14a-6 (1993)).
67. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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knowledge and perfect understanding of German law. '6' Like others,
Buxbaum found the new prominence of institutional investors an occasion
for a comparative perspective.69
Buxbaum's comparative corporate law scholarship includes two types of
comparative analysis, one fairly conventional, another less so.70 In the
conventional part of his analysis, Buxbaum, relying on the German
experience, questions a number of provocative predictions of the future of
the American corporation. In response to Michael Jensen's somewhat
infamous (and, so far at least, inaccurate) prediction of the eclipse of the
publicly held corporation by the LBO association,7' Buxbaum draws
important insight on the limits of private corporate structures from
Germany.72 Similarly, Buxbaum convincingly describes the historical
contingency of the German hausbank structure, thereby questioning the
likelihood or possibility of American evolution towards such an ap-
proach.73
What distinguishes Buxbaum's comparativism is the less convention-
al-and more problematic-aspect of his analysis, namely, the way in
which he seems to draw on the critical theory of the Frankfurt School74
as a source of insight into the comparative legitimating roles of institutional
investors.
The old legitimating ideology-the myth of shareholder supremacy-had to
be abandoned once institutional shareholdership threatened to make it real;
but giving that new ownership a pejorative connotation is at best a defensive
tactic, but hardly a legitimating ideology. That can only be found through
cooperation with these new institutions that, after all, represent all of us in
our capacity as salary and wage earners.
In addition--and not in contradiction-the liberal economic premise on
which this managerialist version of corporatism would function faces a severe
test once ecological imperatives are expected to be operationally satisfied
68. Kfibler, supra note 1, at 97.
69. Buxbaum, supra note 1.
70. Although I will focus largely Buxbaum's article on institutional investors, supra note 1,
attention should also be paid to Richard Buxbaum, Juridification and Legitimation Problems in
American Enterprise Law, in JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE
AREAS OF LABOR, CORPORATE, ANTITRUST AND SOCIAL WELFARE LAW (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987).
71. Michael Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61
(arguing that the publicly held corporation is being replaced by the LBO association).
72. Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 26-27.
73. Id. at 34-40.
74. For an example of the scholarship of the leading modem figure of the Frankfurt School, see
JURGEN HABERMAS, LEGrrMATION CRISIS (Thomas A. McCarthy trans., 1975).
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within its framework.... This, more than concern with the negative
consequences of exposing corporate decision-making to the short-term
mentality of stock and control markets, is what dictates a new respect for a
different, longer term vision of corporate behavior. And this vision, unlike the
adversarial vision of institutional investors as short-term profligates that
underlies the narrow view of short-term versus long-term decision-making
immanent in the liberal economy, needs the cooperation of institutional
ownership with corporate management to be realized. Further, that coopera-
tive venture now has a unique opportunity to be realized. It can find in the
wage-based origin of much of that institutional ownership a unique and
perhaps the only enduring legitimation for embarking on the voyage to
integrate ecological and efficiency concerns in a new statement of corporate
missions and processes.7'
Buxbaum then turns to an analysis of the conditions necessary for the
evolution of a "combined ecologic-economic frame of reference" that will
adequately internalize "the social costs inherent in an appropriately long-
range view of production and distribution policies that are sound from
environmental and social perspectives."76 Only large institutional interme-
diaries can accomplish this, and they can only do so if they have:
mechanisms to express their values to their portfolio firms more directly than
is feasible by means of voting or acting in the capital and, especially, the
control market (though they need those, too). In the second place, they need
mechanisms to formulate these postulated values within their own boundaries
before transmitting them to those firms, in order to legitimate their own
behavior and decisions.'
Buxbaum then turns to German legal/doctrinal structures not for their
capacity to provide new mechanisms for solving the Berle and Means
problem of separation of ownership and control, but, rather, for their
potential to provide legitimating structures in the changing American
context. From this perspective, the two favorites of American
comparativists-codetermination and the two-tier board structure-become
interesting in so far as they provide models through which institutional
75. Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 28-29 (citation omitted). For less comparative approaches to the
legitimacy of the American corporation, see JAMES W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 (1970); Robert Chatov, The Role of
Ideology in the American Corporation, in THE CORPORATE DILEMMA: TRADITIONAL VALUES VERSUS
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS (D. Votaw & S. Sethi eds., 1973); Gerald Frug, The Ideology of
Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984).
76. Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 29.




investors can legitimate corporate structures and in the extent to which
institutional investors can themselves be legitimated through their roles in
such structures. The two-tier board, on Buxbaum's analysis, helps provide
a mechanism for systematic input by institutional investors.
Codetermination is important in helping to undermine the traditional
assumption of hostility between labor and capital. Finally, in terms of the
legitimation of the institutional investors themselves and the formulation of
an appropriate ecologic-economic frame of reference, Buxbaum rejects
various forms of pass-through voting, finding "the German experience with
employee intermediaries and with their selection [to] be instructive.""8
Buxbaum finds that "the elected business agent of the union, in those
sectors which still boast of unions, is the obvious model" of an "intermedi-
ate employee institution[] specifically designed to elicit and transmit
employee views ... to the portfolio-voting intermediaries."79 In this
connection, Buxbaum also tentatively supports "fund advisory or managing
boards substantially elected by their beneficiaries.""
To the Anglo-American sensibility, Buxbaum's approach is problematic
for two reasons. First, by immersing himself so deeply in German legal
culture, he illustrates another danger faced by comparativists, the problem
of "going native." If some comparative analysis is undermined by an
insufficient understanding of the foreign system, Buxbaum runs the
opposite risk, the risk of becoming incomprehensible to the American
corporate law audience. Concepts like "legitimation," however familiar they
may be in the German context, are foreign to the Berle and Means tradition
of corporate governance scholarship described earlier.
The second problem with Buxbaum's analysis is that it is very difficult
to give the concept of "legitimation" non-trivial content, much less to
employ it. If "legitimation" means something like "to make legitimate in
the eyes of society, " then it immediately raises a host of theoretical and
empirical questions. Do legal or economic structures lead to a belief in the
legitimacy of corporations? What is the mechanism by which legal or
economic structures make an institution legitimate in the eyes of society?
How do you measure how legitimate an institution is? By public opinion
surveys? What is the basis for Buxbaum's assumption that there is a
corporate "legitimation crisis" or his speculation that institutional investors
can "solve" that crisis? This passing critique, of course, does nothing more
78. Buxbaurn, supra note I, at 49-50.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 52.
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What, then, are we to make of the comparativism of Professor Roe or
Professor Buxbaum? Return to the observation that Opel, G.M.'s wholly-
owned German subsidiary, is generally considered to be a reasonably well-
managed German corporation. If the presence or absence of a hausbank
does not explain the success of Opel, or, by extension, those successful
German firms that have a hausbank, we must look elsewhere for an
explanation. 2
This leads us to a number of fundamental and rather embarrassing holes
at the center of corporate governance scholarship: What is the connection,
if any, between corporate governance structures and corporate performance?
Even if there is a connection, what is the mechanism that links corporate
"law" with corporate performance?
The assumption of sixty years of corporate governance scholarship has
been that such a connection exists. Berle and Means assumed that the
separation of ownership and control and the resulting powerlessness of
shareholders led to worse performance. Eisenberg and the other scholars
who reconceptualized the board as a monitor of management seemed to
have assumed that a company with a board dominated by independent
outside directors would perform better than a company with a management
dominated board.83 Those heralding the hostile takeover boom of the
1980s assumed that a competitive market for corporate control led to more
effective management." Those heralding the new prominence of institu-
tional investors in the late 1980s have likewise assumed that companies
with large active shareholders will outperform the Berle and Means
81. For a careful and critical assessment of the utility of the concept of "legitimation" in U.S. legal
scholarship, see Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis. L. REV.
379.
82. On this point, Roe and I largely agree. See Roe, Some Differences, supra note 1, at 1934-35.
83. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
84. While there is substantial evidence that the takeovers of the 1980s benefited shareholders
through large premiums, we do not know whether these are one shot gains arising from the influx of
new, higher valuing buyers sparked by the relaxation of the restrictions on horizontal mergers, or
whether these represent long term reduction in agency costs. For a review of the evidence on
shareholder gains, see Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9





While each of these claims makes some sense-they could be true-the
supporting evidence does not exist. While there is a great deal of
fragmentary evidence pointing in different directions, we do not have
anything approaching convincing evidence, nor any robust theoretical
models, on any of the most interesting questions. 6 Do outside directors
improve corporate performance? We really do not know.87 What about
concentrated shareholdings? While there is some evidence that firms with
concentrated holdings outperform firms with dispersed holdings, 88 we
know little about the direction of causation: Do institutional investors
improve corporate performance or, rather, do they choose to invest in firms
with superior performance?
Likewise, we do not know how corporate law affects corporate behavior.
Some sort of direct deterrence (or even "hydraulic") model is implicit in
the standard 1980s argument that the threat of hostile takeovers will induce
managers, even of non-target firms, to manage better: The pressure of
tender offers will push all managers to manage better to keep their jobs.
But a direct deterrence model is implausible, because both the likelihood
of displacement and the direct costs are relatively small. Moreover, if the
direct deterrence model were correct, one would expect a large decline in
mangerial performance when Delaware amended its corporation law to
permit firms to opt out of directorial liability for breaches of the duty of
85. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 71.
86. For a very optimistic recent survey of the empirical evidence, see Bernard Black, The Value
ofInstitutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REv. 895 (1992). The most
recent work likewise fails to find any robust correlation between governance structures and firm
performance, although progress is being made in teasing out the more subtle connections. See, e.g.,
April Klein, Firm Production and Board Committee Structure, (April 1995) (Stem School of Business
(NYU) Working Paper, on file with author); James A. Brickley et al., Corporate Leadership Structure:
On the Separation of the Positions of CEO and Chairman of the Board, (August 23, 1995) (working
paper, on file with author); David Yermack, Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board
of Directors (July 1995) (Stem School of Business (NYU) Working Paper, on file with author).
87. For a recent survey of research on the connection between outside directors and firm
performance, see Sanji Bhagert & Bernard Black, Do Independent Directors Matter? (Jan. 1996)
(working paper, on file with author). Whether and how corporate governance affects performance is a
very complicated issue. One would need to sort out the extent to which governance structure affects the
decisions made, and, when it does, whether and when the effects are positive or negative. A failure, for
example, to detect any systematic correlation between governance structure and performance might be
the result of governance not affecting the decisions made, or might result from governance leading to
better decisions and worse decisions with equal frequency.
88. Id.
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care.89 If the principal sanction is reputational, we know little about how
this sanction works.9"
Thus, it is unclear how we explain why G.M.'s German subsidiary
performs reasonably well despite its American corporate governance
structure and much maligned parent company. The answer puts the whole
debate over corporate governance into an important perspective. The three
best candidates for explaining Opel's (and Daimler Benz's) performance are
likely to be the nature of Europe's automobile markets, the nature of
Germany's managerial labor market, and the social norms internalized by
German managers. As a general matter, product and labor markets and
social norms seem to trump corporate governance structures in determining
success or failure by a wide margin.9
Consider competitive product markets. Where markets are highly
competitive, such as California's high-tech industry in Silicon Valley, the
concerns that preoccupy corporate law academics worrying about corporate
governance are non-issues. If managers slack off or steal from the firm or
build inefficient empires, the firm fails in short order and a firm without
such problems takes its place. In other words, highly competitive product
markets root out suboptimal governance structures before corporate law
needs to pay any attention.
This brings us back, in part, to Henry Manne's point in the article on
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control92 Competition policy and
corporate law are intimately linked. On the one hand, a competition policy
that prohibits all horizontal mergers in the interests of maintaining
competitive product markets undermines the market for corporate control
by removing the most likely acquirers. On the other hand, a competition
policy that permits horizontal mergers that create market power undermines
the competitiveness of the product markets that hold managers' feet to the
fire.
Second, the example of G.M.'s German subsidiary reminds us that social
norms play an enormously important role in the management of corpora-
tions, as they do in other areas of our social life. Because it is difficult for
economic theorists to model norms, those of us who follow the Berle and
Means economic approach to corporate law tend to ignore them.
89. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102b(7) (1991).
90. For an exploration of these issues, see Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: The Peculiar
Mechanisms of Delaware Corporate Law (1996) (working paper, on file with author).
91. See Roe, Some Differences, supra note 1, at 1994.




To the extent that German corporate governance works at the level of
establishing and promoting norms of conduct for German managers and not
on a behaviorist model of stimulus and response-sticks and carrots-the
comparative task becomes incomparably more difficult. Unless German
managers are motivated by the same things that motivate American
managers, there is little reason to believe that the normative structures of
German corporate life have very much to say to America. The
comparativist's problem, of course, is that there is, in fact, little reason to
believe that German managers are motivated by the same things as
American managers. The vast differences in the level of compensation
between the U.S., Germany and Japan suggest just the opposite.93
Now return to Professor Buxbaum. Perhaps he is asking a fundamentally
different question. The question that has motivated many American
corporate law scholars since Berle and Means, and certainly much recent
scholarship, has been, at heart, the question of how we can make managers
sufficiently accountable so that they will manage the corporation for the
shareholders. For Buxbaum, by contrast, the really interesting question is
why society permits the establishment and persistence of massive private
concentrations of economic and political power over which the political
process exercises relatively little control.
This contrast suggests another level on which comparative corporate law
can be important, beyond the new comparativist's claims that the
contrasting corporate structures of Germany and Japan are evidence that
American structures are not inevitable, are not necessarily a product of
natural economic selection, but are, rather, the product of a complicated
process of social choice-Professor Roe's central thesis. Professor
Buxbaum reminds us that the fact-if indeed it is a fact-that other
corporate law systems take radically different questions to be fundamental
should make us wary of being too confident that the central preoccupations
of American corporate law are inevitable or as fundamental as we might
initially believe. They, too, may be the historically contingent product of
a complicated process of social choice. That is to say, corporate law
scholarship, like corporate governance itself, may be path dependent.
93. See GRAEF CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF ExcEss: THE COMPENSATION OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES
204-13 (199 1) (showing that German CEOs earn approximately one-quarter of their U.S. counterparts).
Differences in compensation are ambiguous. It may be that the differences in compensation policy grow,
in part, out of the difference in governance structures, or that both grow out of differences in managerial
norms and culture.
1996]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
VIII. CONCLUSION: PATH DEPENDENCE AND THE DIRECTION OF
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE LAW SCHOLARSHIP
The United States, Japan and the countries of Western Europe all have
successful advanced industrial economies. Likewise, all have their own
distinctive histories: of politics, of economics, and of financial regulation.
Examining them today, one finds that the countries have distinctive and
distinguishable systems of corporate law. In Delaware, for example, one
finds a system of flexible enabling rules. This flexibility is balanced by the
ever present judicial scrutiny that operates under a rubric of fiduciary duty
and employs rather murky standards. In Germany, mandatory rules play a
much greater role with a relatively marginal role for judges. In some
countries, pre-emptive rights are mandatory; in others, they are not. In some
countries, a bidder who acquires more than a certain percentage of the
shares must make a bid for the remainder; in other countries, such is not
the case.
The tremendous variety of approaches to corporate law that one sees in
a comparative survey, combined with an attention to the specific and
distinctive histories of financial regulation, cautions against any straightfor-
ward attempt at transplanting. It also pushes comparative law in a
fundamentally different direction.
Suppose that one assumes, because of product market competition, for
example, that each of the advanced industrial economies has a reasonably
adequate body of corporate law. On this assumption, the comparative
project provides an opportunity to try to grapple with two fundamental
questions of corporate law. First, what problems must a corporate law
system, broadly construed, solve in order to be reasonably adequate to an
advanced industrial economy? Second, what is the range of alternative legal
structures that can respond to those problems, and, perhaps more intriguing-
ly, how do these structures cluster?
Roe's argument for allowing different governance structures to compete
within the Untied States is tempting, especially to those of us who consider
the engine for the development of improved governance structures to be
competition: in product markets, labor markets, capital markets and among
states for chartering revenue. One can hardly quarrel with a proposal to
open up the choice of governance forms to new entry from abroad.
Here, the range of possibilities is critical. A striking difference between
countries like the United States and the United Kingdom, on one side, and




permissive corporate law combined with active judicial review versus a
more restrictive law with less judicial involvement. If, in fact, corporate
governance devices, broadly construed, cluster together in identifiable sets,
then the range of potential choices may be limited. To the extent that
German governance devices-two-tier boards, hausbanks, or whatever else
seems particularly attractive-presuppose a system of mandatory rules and
limited judicial involvement, then the possibility of offering such devices
as an option in the very different U.S. system becomes problematic for two
reasons. First, such forms may have limited appeal when mixed with the
Delaware structure (not itself, of course, a reason not to offer the
possibility). More troubling, to the extent that such governance forms
depend on structural features of the corporate law system, introducing them
into a different structure may have unpredictable negative effects.
Similarly, the notion that the open-textured enabling approach of
Delaware corporate law provides an appropriate model for newly emerging
market economies in the former Eastern Bloc may founder on the lack of
a reliable court system, not to mention the absence of courts with the
sophistication of the Delaware Chancery Court.94 If judicial scrutiny is, in
fact, an essential complement to an enabling approach to corporate law, an
open question, then one cannot take advantage of its benefits without the
appropriate institutional infrastructure.
We know much about corporate law doctrine in different systems. We
know a fair bit about how corporate law works in practice in different
countries. We know a fair bit about the history of different systems. We
know little, however, about the deep structure, or internal logic of corporate
law. Indeed, we do not even know whether any such structure exists.
Comparative corporate law, at its best, provides an opportunity to search
for such an underlying basis.
94. For a discussion of corporate law in Russia, see Bernard S. Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-
Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REv. (forthcoming 1996).
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